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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case is about whether a Homeowner's Association had the power to assess and claim
a lien for road paving against members of the Association. The plaintiffs/respondents/third-partydefendants, consisting of the homemvners' association and officers thereof, will be collectively
referenced as "POVE." The defendants/appellants will be referenced collectively as "the property
owners," and distinctions will be made as necessary when refening to specific individual owners
or non-appellant property owners.
A. Subdivision Background

Pend Oreille View Estates is a subdivision located several miles west of Sandpoint, Idaho
in mountainous terrain. The subdivision is accessed from Baldy Mountain public road.
The subdivision consists of two parts: Phase 1 and Phase 2, respectively. Phase 1 abuts
Baldy Mountain public road. There are private access roads in Phase l from Baldy Mountain
public road, and these private access roads extend into Phase 2. In order to reach Phase 2, one
must travel over the private access roads through Phase I. The private access roads were originally
constructed from dirt and gravel.
The property owners are all owners of property located in Phase 2.
B. Governing Documents

The developer prepared a Vital Infon11ation Statement for both Phase 1 and Phase 2,
bearing the dates of June 20, 1994 and October 12, 1994, respectively. R. Vol. L p. 167; Clerk's
Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Ex. 3). Each Vital Infonnation Statement describes the

1

as being constructed from dirt and gravel, requmng periodic maintenance

the

homeowners' association. Id. Each Phase 2 buyer was required to sign the statement as accepted.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs) for Phase 1 were recorded July 26, 1994,
with an amendment recorded December 20, 1995. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.fTheresa Zinves,
Ex. 8). Phase 2 CCRs were recorded January 25, 1995 with an amendment recorded May 31,

2005. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.f Theresa Zinves, Ex. 9). Both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 CC Rs
required all owners of property located in Phase 1 or Phase 2 to be members of a homeowners
association. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zinves, Ex. 8, ,I 2.01, Ex. 9, ,I 2.01).
Plaintiff Pend Oreille View Estates Owner's Association, Inc., (POVE) a non-profit
corporation, was created as a homeowners association and filed with the Idaho Secretary of State
on February 15, 1995. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.fTheresa Zinves, Ex. 1). The POVE bylaws
also similarly require that all owners of property located in Phase 1 or Phase 2 be members of the
association. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Ex. 5, ,I 3.01).
POVE bylaws establish that maintenance of the private access roads within Phase 1 is the
responsibility of POVE. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.f'Theresa Zini·es, Ex. 5, ,I 3.02.1). This is
confinned by both the Phase I and Phase 2 CCRs. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes,
Ex. 8, ,I,I 2.01-2.04, Ex. 9, ,I,I 2.01-2.04). Both sets ofCCRs further specify that POVE governance

be in accordance with its adopted bylaws. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Ex. 8, ,I,I
2.02, 2.04, Ex. 9, ,I 2.04).

Beyond Phase 1, maintenance of the private access roads is the responsibility of the
individual Phase II owners. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.f'Theresa Zirwes, Ex. 9, ,I,I 2.03-2.04).
2

recorded Phase 2 CCRs state in relevant pmi:
SECTION 2: PHASE I OWNERS' ASSOCIATION
2.01 Membership Required. Each owner shall be required to belong to and
maintain a membership in the Phase I Owners' Association.
2.02 Voting Rights. All Owners of tracts described herein shall be members of
the Association, and except as provided in § 5.02 hereof, each tract ownership,
whether consisting of one or more persons or entities, shall be entitled to one vote,
which vote shall be exercised as the Owners among themselves shall determine.
There shall be no fractional voting and in no event shall more than one vote be cast
with respect to any individual Tract.
2.03 Powers of the Association. The association shall have the power to do all
the things enumerated in the CCR's for Phase I as recorded as Instrument No.
449457, records of B01mer County Idaho. PROVIDED HOWEVER, that except
to the extent the Association has the right to enforce the payment of the lawful
assessments of the Association pertaining directly to the maintenance of roads that
the CCR's for Phase I, recorded as Instrument No. 449457, records of B01mer
County, Idaho, require the Association to maintain, including the right to any lien
on any Tract for failure to pay any assessment(s) lawfully due the Association, the
powers of the Association shall not extend to the Phase II property herein described.
2.04 Limitation on Powers. The Association shall not have the power to
maintain roads over and across the property described in ,I,l 1 and 2 above, or the
property adjacent to or near to the Property as more particularly described in the
By-Laws of the Owner's Association, the owner of which choose and are qualified
as members of the Association, it being the intent of the Declarant that the portion
of access road over and across the Property described in said paragraphs be
maintain [sic] solely at the expense of the owners thereof and that the roads
maintain their existing character as a "sportsman's access or recreational road".
This limitation shall not affect the authority and obligation of the Association to
maintain said access road on property outside the boundaries of the Property
described herein and over which road( s) access to the and from the county road is
necessary. Neither shall this limitation impair the ability of individual owners of
the Lots herein described to improve that pmiion of the road across the property
owned by them. [See §3.04.] The Association shall not have the power to levy any
3

assessments against owners in Phase II except such assessments as pertain directly
to the maintenance of roads as referred to in the CCR's, recorded as Instrument no.
449457, records of Bonner County, Idaho, require said Association to maintain.
Clerk ·s Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zinves, Ex. 9).

C. l\'leetings and Actions

At the annual POVE (HOA) meeting on June 13, 2012, the members resolved that POVE
should consider paving the roads in Phase 1. R. Vol. L p. 149. As such, a special meeting of the
members and board of directors was called for. Id. Notice of the special meeting was sent to all
POVE members. Id.; see also R. Vol. I, pp. 153-154. Property owners Farner and Giacomo were
also notified that they were $5,940 in arrears for unpaid POVE dues and reminded that they would
not be able to vote at the special meeting unless they brought their account cmTent. Id.
On July 24, 2013, pursuant to bylaw 5.03, a special meeting was held by POVE at the
Bonner County Library. Id.; see also R. Vol. I, pp. 153-154. At the special meeting, the members
of POVE voted to amend the POVE bylaws by a vote of 11-0, allowing a "One Time Road Paving
Assessment" assigned to each tract owned by the members of Phase l and Phase 2, to be calculated
by distance from Baldy Mountain public road to the members' property. R. Vol. 1, p. 156. After
the meeting, POVE sent notice to all members that the One Time Paving Assessment had been
approved. R. Vol. L p. 155.
On August 16, 2012, a copy of the adopted bylaws amendment was sent to all POVE
members, including an explanation of the distribution of the cost of paving. R. Vol. L p. 156.
Paving commenced and was completed by September 28, 2012 for a final cost of $214,000. R.
Vol. I, p. 150. The property owners never made any objection to any action taken by POVE at or
4

to the time POVE entered into a contract with Interstate Concrete & Asphalt Co., Inc. R.

Vol. I, p. 179-180. Bills were then sent to each owner pursuant to the fonnula adopted for
calculating the amount thereof based upon the distance from Baldy Mountain Public Road. R. Vol.

I,pp.150-151. Thepropertyownersnevermadeanypayment. R. Vol.l,p.151.

D. Liens
POVE then assessed and filed liens against the property owners pursuant to LC. § 45-810.
The Notices of Claim of Homeowners' Association Lien were recorded in Bonner County in
December, 2012, and copies thereof were provided to each of the respective defendants
immediately after being recorded. R. Vol. 1, p. 151; Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.fTheresa Zirwes,

Exs. 11-13).

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
POVE agrees with and adopts the Procedural History portion of Appellant's Statement of
the Case. For convenience, POVE provides the following truncated version of the indispensable
procedural history pertinent to this appeal.
The Plaintiff, POVE, filed suit November 12, 2013, seeking judgment and foreclosure of
the liens recorded pursuant to LC. § 45-810 against each respective property owner's property
located within Phase 2. See R. Vol. I, pp. 26-69. Plaintiff POVE would later file an Amended
Complaint on April 4, 2014, although the amendments are immaterial to this appeal. See Clerk's

Exhibit 3 (Amended Complaint).
On December 31, 2013, Defendants Answered and asserted counterclaims and third party
claims against Plaintiff POVE HOA and its individual officers, seeking (1) to quiet title, (2) to
5

from assessing liens against Defendants' properties, and (3) ~~,,.~,--~~
title along with (4) attorney fees and costs. See R. Vol. I, pp. 81-89. The underlying basis for
each of the property owners' counter and third party claims was that POVE HOA did not have the
authority to assess and enforce liens against the Defendants' respective properties for the purpose
of road paving. See id.
POVE moved for summary judgment and the prope1iy owners moved for cross summary
judgment, agreeing that the motion was appropriate for a decision as a matter of law. A hearing
was held on July 9, 2014. See. R. Vol.

IL pp. 293-304. The property owners also moved to strike

portions of affidavits submitted in support POVE's motion for summary judgment. See. R. Vol.

IL pp. 248-252, 285-289. The district comi entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re Cross
Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motions to Strike on July 23, 2014, in which the
Comi granted Plaintiff POVE's Motion for Summary Judgment and declined to rule on the
Motions to Strike as moot. See R. Vol. II, pp. 301-302. Judgment was entered in favor of POVE
against all property owners, and attorney fees were awarded to POVE. R. Vol.

IL pp. 305-307.

The property owners then timely filed a Motion to Reconsider, Alter or Amend the
Memorandum Decision along with an Objection to Plaintiffs Application for Attorney's Fees and
Memorandum of Costs. A hearing was held on December 17, 2014. R. Vol.

IL pp. 331-332, 353-

354; Vol. 111, pp. 512-525. On January 20, 2015, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and
Order Re: (1) Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Strike; (2) Denying in Pmi and Granting in Part
Defendants' Objection to Fees and Costs; (3) Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, Alter

6

pp. 512-525. A Judgment and an,

u.u~,,~.,~

Judgment were

t>t'\Tt>rP•,1

by the

court. R. Vol. II, p. 305; R. Vol. 111, p. 526.
The property owners then timely appealed to this Court.
III.

ISSUES

The specific points of error asserted are not entirely clear. The property owners' designated
issues do not appear to track the preliminary statement of issues contained in their multiple Notices
of Appeal. Compare Appellant's Brief ,vith R. Vol. II, pp. 380-385; Vol. 111, pp. 481-486, 5 3 0538. The property owners' Brief appears to state the standard of review for a Motion for Summary

Judgment with respect to the district court's interpretation of the applicable CCRs and bylaws.

Appellant's Brief, pp. l 1-12. In any case, the property owners appear to raise four principal issues:
•

Did the district court err by detern1ining that the road paving constituted "maintenance"
and thus, that the assessments and liens were therefore within the power granted to
POVE under the recorded Phase 2 CCRs?

•

Did the district court err by determining that the POVE bylaws were amended to allow
this one-time road paving assessment?

•

Did the district court err by awarding costs and attorney fees to POVE?

•

Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

The property owners do not appear to appeal the district court's decisions on the motions
to strike portions of certain affidavits submitted in conjunction with the Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment or in conjunction with the Motion for Reconsideration. See Appellant's Briel

R. Vol JI, pp. 380-385; R. Vol. 111, pp 481-486, 530-538. It is unclear whether the property owners
7

motion for reconsideration. To the extent

property owners

new

issues and/or arguments in their reply brief, the Court should decline to consider them or allow
POVE an opportunity to respond.
IV.

ARGUMENT

A. Standard of Review

The prope1iy owners clearly challenge the district court's summary judgment decision.
The standard of review for an appeal from a summary judgment decision is as follows:
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the
same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." \Vhen considering whether the evidence shows a genuine issue of material
fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Moreover, a mere scintilla of evidence
or merely casting a slight doubt of the facts will not defeat summary judgment. In
other words, to create a genuine issue, there must be evidence upon which a jury
may rely.
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103 (2012) (internal citations omitted).

"The fact that the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment does not change the
applicable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate each party's motions on its own
merits." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004).
The same standard of review for a summary judgment applies to a review of a motion to
reconsider the grant Oof a summary judgment. Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 27 6.

8

B. POVE has the power under the recorded Phase 2 CCRs to make assessments and
liens directly pertaining to the maintenance of roads located in Phase 1.

Idaho Code § 45-810 expressly allows homeowner' s associations to claim liens for unpaid
assessments. The property owners appear to contend that POVE cannot claim a lien against their
properties because POVE does not meet the statutory definition of"homeowner's association." In
subsection (6), the statute defines "homeowner's association' as
any incorporated or unincorporated association:
(a) In which membership is based upon owning or possessing an interest in
real prope1iy; and
(b) That has the authority pursuant to recorded covenants, bylaws or other
governing instruments, to assess and record liens against the real property
of its members.
LC.§ 45-810(6).
Clearly, membership in POVE is based upon owning an interest in real property. Clerk's
Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Exs. 5, 8, 9). The Phase 2 CCRs are recorded. Clerk's
Exhibit 2 (1ffidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Ex. 9). The Phase 2 CCRs clearly reference and apply to

the tracts owned by the property owners.

Id.

Moreover, the recorded Phase 2 CCRs

unambiguously provide the authority to make assessments pertaining directly to the maintenance
of roads that the CCRs for Phase 1 require the Association to maintain and to claim a lien against
any Phase 2 property for failure to pay such assessments. Such power makes sense because the
owners of properties located in Phase 2 must travel over the roads through Phase l in order to
access their properties, so the Phase 2 owners rely upon and directly benefit from maintenance of
the Phase 1 roads.
9

Phase 2 CCRs state

relevant part:

SECTION 2: PHASE I OWNERS' ASSOCIATION

2.01 Membership Required. Each owner shall be required to belong to and
maintain a membership in the Phase I Owners' Association.
2.02 Voting Rights. All Owners of tracts described herein shall be members of
the Association, and except as provided in § 5.02 hereof, each tract ownership,
whether consisting of one or more persons or entities, shall be entitled to one vote,
which vote shall be exercised as the Owners among themselves shall detennine.
There shall be no fractional voting and in no event shall more than one vote be cast
with respect to any individual Tract.
2.03 Powers of the Association. The association shall have the power to do all
the things enumerated in the CCR's for Phase I as recorded as Instrument No.
449457, records of Bonner County Idaho. PROVIDED HOWEVER, that except
to the extent the Association has the right to enforce the payment of the lawful
assessments of the Association pertaining directly to the maintenance of roads that
the CCR's for Phase I, recorded as Instrument No. 449457, records of Bonner
County, Idaho, require the Association to maintain, including the right to any lien
on any Tract for failure to pay any assessment(s) lawfully due the Association, the
powers of the Association shall not extend to the Phase II property herein desc1ibed.
2.04 Limitation on Powers. The Association shall not have the power to
maintain roads over and across the property described in ,-i,-i l and 2 above, or the
property adjacent to or near to the Property as more particularly described in the
By-Laws of the Owner's Association, the owner of which choose and are qualified
as members of the Association, it being the intent of the Declarant that the portion
of access road over and across the Property described in said paragraphs be
maintain [sic] solely at the expense of the owners thereof and that the roads
maintain their existing character as a "sportsman's access or recreational road".
This limitation shall not affect the auth01ity and obligation of the Association to
maintain said access road on property outside the boundaries of the Property
described herein and over which road(s) access to the and from the county road is
necessary. Neither shall this limitation impair the ability of individual owners of
the Lots herein described to improve that portion of the road across the property
owned by them. [See §3.04.] The Association shall not have the power to levy any
10

assessments against owners Phase II except such assessments as pertain directly
to the maintenance of roads as referred to in the CCR's, recorded as Instrument no.
449457, records of Bonner County, Idaho, require said Association to maintain.
Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o_fTheresa Zin•ves, Ex. 9)(emphasis added).
In simple tenns, the POVE may require Phase 2 tract owners to pay for maintenance of
roads in Phase l exactly as Phase 1 tract owners are required to do, but POVE does not have the
power to enforce maintenance of roads located in Phase 2.
As the district court recognized, the relevant tenns of,I~ 2.03 and 2.04 of the Phase 2 CCRs
are clear and unambiguous. See R. Vol. JI, p. 300. They allow the Association to levy and collect
assessments against owners in Phase 2 pertaining directly to the maintenance of roads that the
CCRs for Phase l require the Association to maintain, and to claim a lien against any Phase 2
property for failure to pay such assessments. Id. The prope1iy owners seem to acknowledge that
POVE had the authority to make assessments directly pertaining to road maintenance.

See

Appellant's BrieJ; p. 12.
Likewise, there seems to be no dispute that the assessments and liens at issue were for the
purpose of paving the access roads within Phase 1 between Baldy Mountain Public Road and Phase
2. However, the property owners contend that the road paving constituted an "improvement" as a
matter oflaw, rather than "maintenance," so the assessments and resulting liens were beyond the
powers granted by the recorded CCRs. Thus, according to the property owners, the assessments
and liens are not valid under Idaho Code § 45-810 because POVE exceeded the authority granted
by the Phase 2 CCRs.

11

l. The act of road paving "pertain[s] directly to the maintenance ofroads that
the CCR's for Phase I ... require the Association to maintain."
The crux of the prope1iy owners' argument appears to be that paving the Phase 1 roads
constituted "improvement." Therefore, they argue, as a matter of law the paving could not
"pertain[] directly to the maintenance" of the Phase 1 roads. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-18.
TI1e property owners do not contend that the Association's powers granted by the CC&Rs
were unlawful or ineffective, but only that the Association exceeded the powers granted by ,,-i 2.03
and 2.04 of the Phase II CC&Rs. The property owners ask the Court to review the district court's
interpretation of the contractual Phase 2 CCRs:
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to deten11ine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In deten11ining the intent
of the parties, this Comi must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found
ambi 6ruous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is ambiguous
is a question of law. Whether the facts establish a violation of the contract is a
question of law reviewed de novo.

Shawver v. Hucklebeny Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,361, 93 P.3d 685 (2004) (internal citations
omitted). On summary judgment, the district court found the that the ten11s of,-i, 2.03 and 2.04 of
the Phase 2 CCRs clearly and unambiguously allow POVE to levy and collect assessments against
owners in Phase 2 pertaining directly to the maintenance of roads that the Phase 1 CCRs require
POVE to maintain, and to claim a lien against any Phase 2 property for failure to pay such
assessments. R. Vol. IL p. 300.
The district court did not fail "to analyze or discuss whether the paving assessment exceeds
the limited authority of the Association" as the property owners contend. Appellant's Brief, p. 14.
12

property owners never made

their briefing or oral argument on

cross

motions for summary judgment. See R. Vol. II, pp. 232-244, 253-259, 290-292; Tr. Summa,y

Judgment, pp. 13-25.

The first time this argument was raised was on the Motion for

Reconsideration. It is unclear whether the property owners appeal the district court's denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration, but to the extent this Court is willing to entertain that issue, in its
memorandum decision, the district court clearly analyzed the argument and concluded that the
road paving constituted "maintenance" within the clear, unambiguous, plain meaning of the word.

R. Vol. III, pp. 523-524. The property owners do not appear to argue that the CCRs are ambiguous.
The property owners argue that there is a clear distinction between "improve" vs.
"maintain" in 12.03 of the Phase 2 CCRs. They go on to argue that the road paving was forbidden
"improvement" rather than required "maintenance" as a matter of law.
However, the tenn "improve" is used to ensure individual lot owners the right to make
improvements on their own property in Phase 2, whereas "maintenance" and "maintain" refer only
to "the authority and obligation of the Association to maintain said access road" within Phase 1.
In reference to any of POVE's obligations, there is simply no distinction between "maintenance"
and "improvement." The CCR language is provided for this Court's own analysis, but respectfully,
the district court was entirely correct when it detennined:
Nowhere in the CCRs or By-Laws is there a distinction made between road
maintenance and improvement with respect to the Association's obligation for road
maintenance and the Court declines to imply from the use of the word in another
context a distinction between road maintenance and improvement with respect to
the Association where none exists anywhere else in the CCRs. The Court finds that
the CCRs consistently and unambiguously set out the obligation of the Association
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the maintenance of the access roads to and from the county road, and
paving of the road was within the scope of this obligation.
R. Vol. III, p. 524.
The property owners cite several sources of authority in an attempt to establish that the
road paving was not "maintenance" because it was "improvement" as a matter oflaw. However,
careful review reveals that none of the authority cited by the property owners supp01is their
contention, while the weight of the authority suggests the opposite.
The prope1iy owners appear to argue that the CC&R section at issue is a "restrictive
covenant" "in derogation of the common law right to use land for all lawful purposes," so the court
should not find that the paving constituted "maintenance" because to do so would "extend by
implication [a] restriction not clearly expressed." However, this is a non sequitur. The CC&R
section merely restricts the Association's power to levy assessments rather than restricting any use
ofland by landowners, so the principle cited by the property owners is inapplicable.
The Idaho Sales and Use Tax Ref,rulations cited by the property owners support the
contention that road paving is an "improvement." See IDAPA 35.01.02.013. However, they say
nothing about whether road paving qualifies as "maintenance," which is the actual issue to be
decided on this appeal. The regulations merely determine when a contractor will be subject to
Idaho Sales and Use taxes. Likewise, the tax board appeal case cited by the property owners says
nothing about whether road paving can be "maintenance."
The property owners appear to place great weight on Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. v.
Summervt'ind Partners, LLC, 157 Idaho 600, 338 P.3d 1204 (2004). However, in Hap Taylor, the
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was addressing whether a constructed roadway qualifies as a

a

developer may claim a materialman's lien under I.C. § 45-501, and whether such road "structures"
would constitute multiple "improvements," requiring that a lien claimed against multiple
improvements owned by the same person must designate the amount of lien attributable to each
respective improvement in order for the lien to obtain a priority date under § 45-508. See id.
Again, the decision says nothing about whether road paving qualifies as road maintenance, nor
does the decision make any distinction between "improvements" vs. "maintenance."
Absent from the property owners' argument is any justification for the implied premise to
their argument that a certain act cannot be classified as both "improvement" and "maintenance."
Such a claim would strain credibility. "Maintenance" is unavoidably a specie of "improvement."
If there is any distinction to be made, it is merely one of degree such that "maintenance" is merely
a series of temporary "improvements" that will require frequent revisiting. POVE isn't forbidden
from improving; it's granted the power to "maintain." None of the property owners' cited authority
can fairly be read to establish mutually exclusive definitions, which their argument depends upon
entirely.
Furthennore, for good reason, there is no maxim of construction that to the extent words
have overlapping but differing definitions, they should be construed as mutually exclusive. Such
a maxim would be counter to basic logic, would be counter to the entire concept of word
definitions, and would lead to absurd results, such as here, where "maintenance" would be
forbidden from including any sort of "improvement."
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Meanwhile, the Idaho Supreme Court has already recognized that "maintenance" includes
"improvements" such as making a new road bed and reconstructing portions of a road:
Testimony regarding maintenance on the road consisted of descriptions of
significant improvements done by the County, at County expense, including
widening, realigning, adding a new roadbed and drainage in late 1949, and
reconstructing portions of the road between 1952 and 1960.
Floydv. Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,724, 52 P.3d 863 (2002)(emphasis added). Although

arguably distinguishable in that the Floyd Court evaluated whether an originally public road had
become a private road by reason of abandomnent, the Court in Floyd explicitly recognized that
"maintenance" includes "improvements."
Further, in Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P.2d 432 (1959), the Court evaluated
whether a legislative appropriation for construction of an office building was unconstitutional
under Idaho Const., Art. VII, § 17. The Court acknowledged that Washington had adopted the
following definition of "maintenance" as it relates to public roads:
We must first ascertain what is meant by maintenance of roads. It has been held
that the phrase "maintenance of public roads" is not restricted literally to the manual
labor of repairing existing roads. The phrase has a broader meaning and includes
the doing of everything necessarily and appropriately c01mected with and incidental
to the laying out, opening, and the construction of public roads and the maintenance
of an efficient road system. (Italics ours.)
Id. (quoting State ex rel. King County v. Murrow, 199 Wash. 685, 93 P.2d 304,307 (1939) (italics

added by State ex rel. King County)). The Connecticut Supreme Court has similarly recognized,
"The repair of a highway, (and macadamizing is but a mode of repair) is not in any just sense a
public work or improvement." New Haven v. Whitney, 36 Conn. 373, 376 (1870).

16

transportation statutes provide

and road

guidance

paving are included within "maintenance." Utah's Right ofWay Across Federal Lands Act defines
"maintenance" as "any physical act of upkeep of a highway or repair of wear or damage whether
from natural or other causes, including the following: ... (j) resurfacing with the same or improved
materials. Utah Code§ 72-5-301. Moreover, Utah's Construction, Maintenance, and Operations
Act defines "Improvement project" as "construction and maintenance as defined in this section
except for that maintenance excluded under Subsection (2)," thereby recognizing, again, that
Utah Code § 72-6-109( d).

improvement can be maintenance.

That same act then defines

"1naintenance" as:
the keeping of a road facility in a safe and usable condition to which it was
constructed or improved, and includes:
(i)

the reworking of an existing surface by the application of up to and
including two inches of bituminous pavement; ...

Utah Code§ 72-6-109(e).
Finally, the factual situation

111

this case further establishes the road paving was

"maintenance." The notice advising of the upcoming special meeting to discuss road paving
included a summary of the reasons therefor. R. Vol. L p. 153. To summarize, the road was dusty
and bumpy, the cost to maintain the gravel surface had risen to become unreasonable, and paving
would benefit all properties.

Id.

The cost of dues to perform road maintenance had risen

continually, yet the condition of the road remained unsatisfactory. Due to its location (near
Schweitzer Basin), significant snow plowing is required during the winter.
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The gravel is

pushed off the road during snow plowing, and the spring

causes

deterioration every year.
Thus, as a matter of law, "maintenance" includes the act of road paving in this instance
because POVE was simply restoring the original roadway in the most efficient manner to maintain
its existing use into the future.

2. The assessments and liens were properly levied by POVE against the
property owners.
The assessments and liens were properly levied. At the annual meeting on June 13, 2012,
the members decided that POVE should consider paving the roads in Phase I and called a special
meeting in order to discuss and decide the road paving issue to be held July 24, 2012. R. Vol. 1,
p. 149. All POVE members were provided notice of and invited to the special meeting. See R.

Vol. L p. 153. The letter also infonned the members that they would be pennitted to vote by proxy

in the event that they could not attend the meeting. Id.
The Phase 1 CCRs, Phase 2 CCRs, and the POVE bylaws all provide that members who
are delinquent for any assessments may have their voting rights suspended. See Clerk's Exhibit 2
(Affidavit of Theresa Zirvves, Ex. 3, ,r4.04(a); Ex. 8,

,r 2.04(/);

Ex. 9, ,I 2.03). POVE provided

notice to the delinquent prope1iy owners (Giacomo and Farner) that they were in aiTears, the
amount thereof, encouraged the delinquent property owners to bring their accounts current in order
to vote, and warned of the importance and potential consequences of the upcoming detern1ination
regarding road paving. See R. Vol. L p. 154. Property owner Giacomo attended the meeting, but
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to

her delinquent dues, and was thus

ability to vote. None

the other

property owners attended, submitted a vote by proxy, or sent a representative to the meeting.
At the meeting on July 24, 2012, the POVE members voted to amend the bylaws and adopt
the one-time road paving assessment. R. Vol. 1. p. 149. Immediately afterward, notice was sent
to all property owners in Phase 1 and Phase 2 that the proposed amendment had been approved,
including a bill for each respective assessment. R. Vol. 1, p. 149-150, 155. A copy of the
amendment showing approval with an explanation of the distribution of the cost of paving was
sent to all owners on August 16, 2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 156. None of the prope1iy owners paid their
assessments. R. Vol. 1, p. 151.

POVE then recorded the liens against the property owners'

respective properties in December, 2012, sending a copy thereof on that same date. R. Vol. I. p.

151; Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Exs. 11-13).

3. POVE passed an amendment to the POVE Bylaws to include and allow the
"One-Time Paving Assessment."
The property owners also apparently contend that POVE's road paving assessments and
liens are not valid because the amount thereof are in violation of POVE's bylaws regarding
"special assessments."
The POVE bylaws provide for initial regular assessments of $50.00 per tract annually.

Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.fTheresa Zirwes, Ex. 5,

,r 4.01).

The bylaws then state that the regular

assessments cannot be increased by more than twenty percent (20%) per year. Id. Finally, the
bylaws provide for "special assessments," which "may not exceed 100% of an annual assessment."

Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Ex. 5,
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,r

4.02). The bylaws provide for their

by

majority of the Members

Association at any meeting

the

properly noticed." Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.fTheresa Zirwes, Ex. 5, ,-i 10.01).
This amendment procedure was followed. R. Vol. 1, p. 149-155.

The property owners

do not contend that the bylaws could not be amended or that the amendment was somehow
procedurally defective and thus ineffective. Therefore, POVE successfully amended its own
bylaws to include and allow the one-time road paving assessment. As such, POVE's bylaws
cannot be said to forbid the one-time road paving assessment because the bylaws were specifically
amended to allow the assessment.
The prope11y owners simply mischaracterize the bylaw amendment as a "special
assessment" rather than what it really was: an amendment to the bylaws allowing a "One-Time
Road Paving Assessment." R. Vol. I, p. 156. The POVE members recognized this potential
discrepancy and took preemptive action to amend the bylaws in order to allow the one-time paving
assessment at issue in this case. As such, the amounts of any annual assessments are irrelevant
and will not be addressed.
C. Attorney Fees
1. The district court correctly awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees to
POVE.
"In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees ... to the prevailing

party ... when provided for by any statute or contract." LR. C.P. 54(e)(1 ), see also l. C. § 1 121.
Both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 CCRs state at ,-i 5.03:
The provisions of this Declaration, or any lawful amendments, may be enforced by
the Declarant or a Tract Owner, by using either an action for damages arising out
of a violation, ... , In any action for the enforcement of the CC&R's, if the relief
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prayed for is granted whole or part, the Declarant or Tract Owner prevailing
shall be entitled to recover necessary court costs for the action, including reasonable
attorney's fees.
Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Theresa Zirwes, Ex. 8, ~ 5.03, Ex. 9, ~ 5.03). The Declarant of both

CCRs assigned all of its authority to POVE by creating POVE (~ 1. 02) and providing it with the
power to enforce the CCRs (~ 2. 04). Thus, as the prevailing party below, POVE was entitled to
reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the governing contract

the Phase 2 CCRs.

In addition, the CCRs also provide that governance be in accordance with the more
particular POVE bylaws. Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.fTheresa Zint·es, Ex. 8,

~~

2.02, 2.04, Ex.

9, ~ 2.04). The POVE bylaws provide that "in any action for enforcement of this [assessment/lien]

provision, the Association shall be entitled to its costs and reasonable attorney's fees, so long as
the Association is the prevailing party in such action." Clerk's Exhibit 2 (Affidavit o.f Theresa
Zirwes, Ex. 3,

~

4.04(e). As such, the contracts at issue in this case provide that the prevailing

party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees.
POVE was granted all of the relief it requested, so it is the prevailing party. As such, the
district court did not err by awarding reasonable attorney fees to POVE.

2. POVE requests and is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
POVE requests attorney fees on appeal. An award of attorney fees on appeal may be
granted under I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54( e)(1 ), and I.A.R. 41 to the prevailing party where provided
for by contract. See, e.g., Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 452, 210 P.3d 552 (2009). As set
forth in the section above regarding attorney fees awarded by the district court, POVE was the
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at the

and vvas entitled to reasonable

court

to

governing contracts in this case, so POVE is also entitled to reasonable attorney fees appeal.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, POVE respectfully submits that the judgment of the distiict
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court be affim1ed in its entirety.
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